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Abstract—The paper proposes a methodology to effectively
address the increasingly important problem of distributed fault-
tolerant control for large-scale interconnected systems. The
approach dealt with combines, in a holistic way, a distributed
fault detection and isolation algorithm with a specific tube-based
model predictive control scheme. A distributed fault-tolerant
control strategy is illustrated to guarantee overall stability and
constraint satisfaction even after the occurrence of a fault. In
particular, each subsystem is controlled and monitored by a
local unit. The fault diagnosis component consists of a passive
set-based fault detection algorithm and an active fault isolation
one, yielding fault-isolability subject to local input and state
constraints. The distributed active fault isolation module – thanks
to a modification of the local inputs – allows to isolate the fault
that has occurred avoiding the usual drawback of controllers
that possibly hide the effect of the faults. The Active Fault
Isolation method is used as a decision support tool for the fault
tolerant control strategy after fault detection. The distributed
design of the tube-based model predictive control allows the
possible disconnection of faulty subsystems or the reconfiguration
of local controllers after fault isolation. Simulation results on a
well-known power network benchmark show the effectiveness of
the proposed methodology.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of monitoring and controlling large-scale net-
works of interconnected dynamic systems (LSSs for short)
currently attracts a significant interest in academia and industry
[1]. In this respect, the ever increasing demand for reliability,
dependability and safety requires the design of control systems
able to compensate the effects of critical and unpredictable
changes in the LSS’s dynamics (such as faults and malfunc-
tions), while maintaining the performance of the controlled
system at some acceptable level (see, for instance [2]). This
is the well-known paradigm of Fault Tolerant Control (FTC).
In this paper, we illustrate a design approach of a distributed
FTC scheme that guarantees the overall stability of a LSS even
after the fault-occurrence. The proposed framework is based
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on the integration of a distributed active fault isolation scheme
and a suitable distributed controller reconfiguration strategy.
A. State of the Art and Motivations
In the literature, FTC methodologies are often subdivided
into two main categories (see, for example, the survey [3]):
passive FTC and active FTC. In qualitative terms, passive
FTC refers to the design of controllers that are robust to the
occurrence of potential faults without any reconfiguration or
modification of the control system. Passive FTC techniques
are well suited in low-dimensional applications in which the
possibility of modifying the control system is not allowed, but
their effectiveness in applications is rather limited.
In active FTC techniques (see, for instance, [4], [5], [6],
[7]), a monitoring component is included in the control scheme
providing a run-time Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) deci-
sion about the possible occurrence of a fault or malfunction on
the basis of input-output measurements. After fault detection,
the controller may be suitably reconfigured according to the
diagnosis decision to recover an acceptable performance of
the closed-loop system. With a few exceptions [6], [7], [8],
classical active FTC techniques show good performance only
in scenarios where faults are detected and isolated correctly
and instantaneously (see, for instance [4], [5]). These sce-
narios typically require assuming the absence of process and
measurement disturbances [9], [10], [11]. This assumption is
rather unrealistic in real use-cases, thus causing delays and
errors in FDI, in turn possibly leading to instability, violation
of state constraints, and the inability to implement the suitable
controller after fault isolation [12].
Indeed, a major issue affecting most active FTC schemes
relates to the possibly conflicting dynamic behaviors of the
FDI scheme and the reconfigurable controller. More specifi-
cally, the feedback controller may hide the presence of faults
by compensating their effects (see as example the simulation
analysis in [13]), thus making the FDI task much more difficult
or even impossible [14], [15] – as is well known, a similar
issue affects several closed-loop identification techniques in
poor excitation scenarios.
A radically different context arises in application use-cases
allowing to affect the closed-loop dynamics by acting at
run-time on the control inputs. This paves the way to the
so-called active FDI methodologies. Active FDI approaches
consist in suitably modifying the control input to improve
fault detectability and isolability capabilities [16], [17], [18],
[19], [20], [21], [22], [23]. This allows to possibly reduce
detection and isolation time. The typical main limitation of
active FDI techniques concerns high computational cost and
complexity [24], [25]. This drawback restricts the applicability
2of this approach to low-dimensional systems [25], [26], [27],
[28], [29], even though some approaches have been suggested
in the literature to alleviate the computational complexity (see
as example [23]).
Coping with the above-mentioned computational complex-
ity in the context of LSSs, dealt with in this paper, requires
a distributed approach. Differently from currently available
distributed/decentralized architectures for FDI (see as example
[30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36]), in this paper the active
FDI scenario is considered.
B. Objectives and Contributions
The main objective of the paper is the design of a distributed
active FTC architecture for linear LSSs with bounded distur-
bances, where the LSS is monitored by a network of local
fault diagnosers. Each diagnoser is based on a local passive
fault detection scheme and a local active fault isolation tool.
The network of diagnosers is integrated with a distributed
tube-based Model Predictive Control (MPC) scheme (based
on [37], [38]). After fault detection, the active fault isolation
component aims at i) generating a control sequence able to
guarantee the local isolation of the fault, while satisfying state
constraints and stability properties, and at ii) subsequently
allowing the reconfiguration of the local controllers according
to a suitable decision-making process. The use of active fault
isolation allows to possibly improve performance with respect
to traditional passive approaches, in terms of isolation time
and fault isolability. We take advantage of the scalable design
of the local controllers to allow the possible disconnection
of faulty subsystems when the local control reconfiguration is
not feasible. In this way, the proposed distributed FTC strategy
guarantees stability and constraint satisfaction for the overall
LSS at any time, even after the occurrence of the fault. This
approach differs from recent distributed/decentralized FTC
techniques such as [34], [39], [40], [13] by exploiting the
active FDI scenario.
Summing up, the main contributions of the paper are1:
• the design of a distributed and scalable Active Fault Iso-
lation framework for large-scale interconnected systems;
this represents a more challenging scenario, requiring
to take into account the possibly unknown or uncertain
influences between subsystems;
• the development of a distributed active FTC strategy
for the reconfiguration of the network of systems and
controllers, guaranteeing the overall stability of the LSS
and constraint satisfaction even after the occurrence of a
fault;
• a FTC strategy, where the opportunity to off-line ex-
plicitly solve the optimization problem for local active
fault isolation permits to support decisions during the
online monitoring and fault-tolerant control of the LSS
(see Section V);
• the isolation of classes of faults where the parameters
characterizing each faulty model are uncertain and may
vary within a defined range of values. Furthermore, the
1Preliminary results have been presented in [41] in a decentralized scenario.
possible presence of measurement noise is taken into
account (Section VI) and extensive simulation analysis
on a Power Network System benchmark are provided.
C. Organization of the Paper
In Section II, the considered problem is introduced. In
Section III the adopted distributed control architecture is
presented, while in Section IV we first propose a passive set-
based fault detection method and then the active fault isolation
approach. After that, the FTC strategy is explained in Section
V. In Section VI we offer some possible directions in which
the results can be extended. Finally, simulation results on a
Power Network System are presented in Section VII and some
conclusions are given in Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System, model and features
Consider a discrete-time affine large scale system composed
of N subsystems. Each subsystem i ∈N = {1, . . . ,N} obeys
one of ni possible dynamics (all known). When model mi ∈
Mi = {1, · · · ,ni} is active, the subsystem i is governed by the
following set of equations
xi(k+ 1) = A
[mi ]
ii xi(k)+B
[mi]
i u
[mi]
i (k)+ z
[mi]
i (k)+ r
[mi]
i (1)
z
[mi]
i (k) = ∑
j∈N
[mi ]
i
A
[mi]
i j x j(k)+di(k), (2)
where xi(k) ∈ R
nxi , u
[mi]
i (k) ∈ R
nui denote respectively the
states and the input vectors of subsystem i, with xi(0) ∈ R
nxi
the state initial condition. The term z
[mi ]
i (k)∈R
nxi accounts for
the coupling with neighboring subsystems and the presence of
disturbances di(k), where the set of neighbors to subsystem i
is defined as
N
[mi ]
i = { j ∈N :A
[mi ]
i j 6= 0, i 6= j}.
Matrices A
[mi]
i j ,∀i, j ∈N are blocks of matrix A
[m], where this
latter represents the dynamic matrix of the overall system,
with m = [m1, . . . ,mN ]. For each i ∈ N , we assume mi = 1
represents the nominal dynamics, while the other models
describe possible faulty dynamics. We assume that the switch
between nominal and faulty dynamics happens in an abrupt
way. For the sake of notation simplicity, in the following the
results will be presented assuming that each mi 6= 1 represents
a specific fault with known parameters, but everything can
simply be extended to the case that each model is a class of
faults described by interval matrices. The constant vector r
[mi]
i
is used to model constant bias. The following assumptions are
required:
Assumption 1: The disturbance di(k) is bounded by a
known set Di, i.e. di(k) ∈ Di, ∀k, ∀i.
Assumption 2: The considered LSS allows the physical
unplugging of subsystems.
Remark 1: The term Plug-and-Play denotes the property
of distributed control and monitoring architectures to allow
the plug-in/unplugging of some subsystems only requiring
local operations and tests for the reconfiguration. Examples
3Fig. 1. The proposed distributed architecture. The subsystems are physically
interconnected. Each subsystem is controlled by a local controller Ci and
monitored by a local diagnoser Di, both taking measurements from the
local subsystems. Local controllers and diagnosers may communicate with
neighboring subsystems in a distributed way. After fault detection, the active
fault isolation tool may compute an input control sequence to allow the
isolation of the fault.
of systems satisfying Assumption 2 include water distribu-
tion networks, power networks, microgrids, etc. We refer the
Reader to [37] for details about Plug-and-Play approaches.
B. A Glimpse on the Active FTC Approach
In order to obtain scalable control and monitoring proce-
dures, each subsystem is governed by a local controller and
monitored by a local fault diagnoser, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Each local controller (see Section III) is subject to local input
and state constraints
xi(k) ∈ Xi, u
[mi ]
i (k) ∈Ui,
the influence of bounded neighboring subsystems states
x j(k) ∈ X j, j ∈N
[mi]
i ,
and is robust to bounded disturbances (see Section III).
For each i ∈ N , sets Xi,Ui,Di are all zero-centered zono-
topes [42] known a priori.
It is worth noting that the design of the local controllers
relies on the knowledge of the sets X j from the neighboring
subsystems j ∈N
[mi]
i .
MPC is a well suited technique to control systems subject
to input and state constraints. In the following, we rely on the
distributed approach presented in [38]. This scheme guarantees
in a distributed way robust stability and constraint satisfaction
for the overall system. Moreover, this approach is suitable to
be integrated with an active fault diagnosis approach for FTC.
Each subsystem is monitored in healthy conditions by a
local passive set-based fault detection method, following a
similar approach to the one proposed in [43] in the centralized
Model 1
Model 2
Projection of intersection 
onto the input space
Input Set
Bad Set
Fig. 2. Projection of the local state reachable sets onto the joint local state-
input space (left). Projection of the intersection of the polytopes on the left
into the input space (right, top). Choice of the local inputs to obtain state
reachable sets separability (right bottom).
case. When a fault is detected in a local subsystem at time
kd , the related controller is put on stand-by to avoid that the
feedback controller hides the effect of the fault, and a local
active FDI procedure is triggered (Section IV-B). To enhance
fault isolation, Active FDI aims to determine which dynamics
subsystem i is subject to, by injecting a minimally harmful (in
length and/or norm2) sequence (u
[mi]
i (kd), · · · ,u
[mi ]
i (kd + Ti−
1)) able to guarantee that any possible state (or state sequence)
of subsystem i at time kd + Ti is consistent with only one
mi ∈ Mi (see Figure 2). In order to not spoil the stability
properties of the overall system, such procedure is performed
while guaranteeing that the local subsystem evolves within
its state bounds Xi, regardless of the active fault mode mi.
Moreover, if feasible, the state is constrained to suitable sets,
so that the local controllers can be reconfigured after fault
isolation according to the identified model (see Section V).
Note that, by pursuing a fast fault isolation, the advantage of
active FDI, when compared to a passive FDI approach, is that
it increases the chances of safely reconfiguring the controllers
after isolation without losing stability. In fact, the fault could
drive the state outside the feasibility area of the controller.
Assumption 3: In each subsystem, it is assumed that the
diagnosis is fast enough to avoid the switching between models
during [kd , · · · ,kd +Ti].
Once the fault is isolated, the local controller is reconfigured
in order to still guarantee the stability and constraint satisfac-
tion of the overall system. Summing up, the main contribution
of the paper is the distributed FTC strategy illustrated in
Section V, which, based on local properties, guarantees that
the presence of a fault does not compromise the stability of
the network of interconnected systems.
Remark 2: The adoption of a distributed and scalable archi-
tecture allows to reduce the computational complexity of the
proposed method, which depends linearly only on the number
of neighboring subsystems.
2In this way, the action of the controller for Active Fault Isolation reasons
is reduced in terms of time and magnitude of the input signal. High values
of input signals could be not feasible nor safe for the system. Moreover, in
general, it is better to minimize the isolation time in order to achieve a fast
diagnosis decision and a prompt reconfiguration of the controllers to guarantee
stability and constraint satisfaction.
4C. Definitions
1) Basic notation: In the following, a tilde is used to
indicate sequences of vectors associated with the model (1)-
(2). More specifically, when referring to u˜
[mi ]
i (l : k), z˜
[mi]
i (l : k),
the notation stands for u˜
[mi]
i (l : k)=(u
[mi ]
i (l),. . . ,u
[mi ]
i (k− 1)),
z˜
[mi]
i (l : k)=(z
[mi]
i (l), . . . ,z
[mi]
i (k− 1)), while x˜i(l : k) =
(xi(l),. . . ,xi(k)), for x˜i(l : k). For a generic variable σ , the
notation σ˜(l : k|l) indicates that the sequence is computed at
time l. For a set W , the notation W˜{k}=W×. . .×W is used to
indicate its k-th cartesian product.
2) Reachable sets: For each subsystem i, the state
of model mi, k-steps ahead, is given by the function
φ
[mi]
i{k}
(
u˜
[mi ]
i (0 : k),xi(0), z˜
[mi]
i (0 : k)
)
with φ
[mi ]
i{k} :R
nuik×Rnxi×
R
nxik→Rnxi the state solution map. Given an initial condition
xi(k0), a sequence u˜
[mi ]
i (k0 : k|k0) and a set Z˜
[mi]
i{k−k0}
(which can
be computed on the basis of sets X j and Di) the state reachable
set at time k is defined as
X
[mi ]
i
(
u˜
[mi]
i (k0 : k|k0),xi(k0), Z˜
[mi ]
i{k−k0}
)
=
{
φ
[mi]
i{k−k0}
(
u˜
[mi]
i (k0 : k|k0),xi(k0), z˜
[mi]
i (k0 : k)
)
:
x˜ j(k0 : k) ∈ X˜ j{k−k0},∀ j ∈N
[mi]
i , d˜i(k0 : k) ∈ D˜i{k−k0}
}
.
When clear from the context, the arguments of maps will be
omitted, and with some abuse of notation the reachable sets
will be denoted as X
[mi ]
i (k|k0).
III. SCALABLE CONTROL STRATEGIES SUITABLE FOR
DISTRIBUTED FTC
The proposed FTC method assumes that in nominal con-
ditions each subsystem is equipped with a local tube-based
robust MPC controller which is designed, for each i∈N ,mi ∈
Mi, based on [38]. More specifically, in order to allow the
design of the distributed Active Fault Isolation method in
Section IV-B and of the FTC strategy for LSSs in Section
V, the following notable features are required for the control
architecture:
• Thanks to the distributed framework, leading to local
low-dimension and the choice of a tube-based MPC
control scheme, robust to the coupling with neighboring
subsystems and to the disturbances, it is possible to
explicitly compute the feasibility domains for the local
controllers, i.e. the domain sets where stability and con-
straints satisfaction are guaranteed. This is a fundamental
ingredient which will be used for the reconfiguration of
local controllers after fault isolation if the local Active
Fault Isolation problem is feasible (see (15a)-(15g) in
Section IV-B and Assumption 4 below). As it will be
later clarified, this will allow to guarantee the stability of
the LSS even after the occurrence of a fault.
• The Plug-and-play feature (see [37] for details) is used to
allow the possible disconnection of faulty subsystems, in
the case that the presence of the fault may compromise
local and/or global stability. In fact, if fault isolation is
not feasible, or a safe control reconfiguration not possible,
the disconnection of the faulty subsystem may avoid or
reduce the propagation of the faults effect in the LSS.
In this case (see Section V for details about the FTC
strategy), at most neighboring controllers and diagnosers
may be reconfigured.
The above features motivate our choice for the control
architecture briefly summarized in Section III-A.
Assumption 4: The pair (A
[mi]
ii ,B
[mi ]
i ) is stabilizable for all
i ∈N , mi ∈Mi.
This assumption is only required for the sake of presen-
tation simplicity, in order to allow the reconfiguration of the
controllers after fault isolation. In this case, the local control
laws are synthesized off-line for every model mi ∈Mi. In the
case the assumption does not hold for some faulty models
mi ∈ M¯i ⊆ M
+
i ≡ Mi\{1}, then the fault-tolerant control
architecture can be designed anyway, requiring the unplugging
of the faulty subsystem if the local controller cannot be
reconfigured (see Section V for details).
The design of the control architecture in nominal conditions
is not the main focus of this paper. The selected approach
based on [38] is briefly described in the following section
in order to introduce some notation and base the stability
properties of the proposed FTC. Note that the approach can
be used in a decentralized or in a distributed way, depending
on the availability of communication resources.
A. Tube-Based MPC
According to a scalable tube-based robust MPC approach,
the control action for each i ∈ N is given by the sum of
two terms: i) a nominal input u
[mi]
i (k), obtained by solving,
at each time step, a Finite Horizon Optimal Control Problem
(FHOCP) [44] subject to the nominal model
x
[mi ]
i (k+ 1) = A
[mi]
ii x
[mi]
i (k)+B
[mi]
i u
[mi]
i (k)+ r
[mi]
i (3)
and ii) a linear feedback term
K
[mi]
ii
(
xi(k)− x
[mi]
i (k)
)
+∑
j∈Ni
δi jK
[mi]
i j x j(k),
designed so that xi tracks the prediction of nominal model (3),
where K
[mi]
ii ∈R
nui×nxi , K
[mi]
i j ∈R
nui×nx j and δi j ∈ {0,1} , i, j ∈
N . The parameters δi j can be chosen by the designer to select
the subsystems from which the local controller is receiving
information. More specifically, when δi j = 1 ∀i ∈N , ∀ j ∈
N
[mi]
i , then the communication network coincides with the
coupling graph, resulting in a distributed scenario. On the other
hand, if δi j = 0 ∀i∈N , ∀ j ∈N
[mi]
i , then the control scheme
is completely decentralized.
Assumption 5: Matrices K
[mi]
ii and K
[mi]
i j can be locally
designed as in [38] (Algorithm 1) to guarantee the overall
stability of the LSS.
The resulting tube-based MPC feedback law for each sub-
system is
κ
[mi ]
i (x¯
[mi]
i (k)) = u¯
[mi]
i (k)+K
[mi]
ii (xi(k)− x
[mi ]
i (k))
+ ∑
j∈N
[mi ]
i
δi jK
[mi]
i j x j(k). (4)
5As previously stated, the nominal input u
[mi]
i (k) is obtained,
at each time step, by applying only the first element of the
FHOCP solution (receding horizon scheme). In order to obtain
a robust MPC controller, besides the standard elements [44]
(nominal dynamics (3), a quadratic cost, terminal state and
terminal penalty satisfying standard assumptions in order to
obtain recursive feasibility and stability) the FHOCP requires
extra constraints which are now recalled (see [38] for further
details).
Denote with e
[mi]
i (k) ≡ xi(k)− x
[mi]
i (k) the tracking error
between the real state xi(k), obtained by (1) applying (4), and
the nominal state x
[mi ]
i (k) (solution of the nominal model (3)
with nominal input u
[mi]
i (k)). The tracking error dynamics can
be modelled as
e
[mi]
i (k+ 1) =A
[mi]
Kii
e
[mi ]
i (k)+w
[mi]
i (k), (5)
where, according to Ass. 5, A
[mi]
Kii
≡ A
[mi]
ii +B
[mi ]
i K
[mi]
ii is de-
signed to be Schur, and
w
[mi]
i (k) = ∑
j∈Ni
(A
[mi ]
i j + δi jB
[mi]
i K
[mi]
i j )x j(k)+di(k).
Note that
w
[mi]
i (k) ∈W
[mi]
i ≡
⊕
j∈N
[mi]
i
(A
[mi ]
i j + δi jB
[mi]
i K
[mi]
i j )X j⊕Di. (6)
Thanks to the stability of A
[mi]
Kii
and the boundedness of
W
[mi ]
i (resulting from the bounds X j, j ∈ N
[mi ]
i , and Di),
it is possible to prove that there exists a robust positively
invariant set E
[mi]
i ⊂R
nxi such that A
[mi ]
Kii
E
[mi]
i +W
[mi]
i ⊂ E
[mi]
i . If
e
[mi]
i (0) ∈ E
[mi]
i and w
[mi ]
i (k) ∈W
[mi ]
i , ∀k ∈N, then the solution
of (5) satisfies e
[mi]
i (k) ∈ E
[mi]
i , ∀k ∈ N, being E
[mi]
i a robust
positively invariant set that can be computed as described in
[45].
Finally, the extra constraints required by the FHOCP in order
to obtain a tube-based robust MPC controller are the following:
• Initial constraint
xi(k)− x¯
[mi]
i (k) ∈ E
[mi]
i , ∀k ∈ N.
• Tightened state and input constraints
U
[mi]
i ≡Ui⊖ (K
[mi]
ii E
[mi]
i
⊕
j∈N
[mi]
i
δi jK
[mi]
i j X j), (7)
X
[mi]
i ≡ Xi⊖E
[mi]
i . (8)
Remark 3: Note that, in order to the FHOCP Problem to be
feasible, it is necessary that bothU
[mi ]
i and X
[mi]
i are non-empty,
i.e. the effect of the disturbance and the coupling between
subsystems is required to be sufficiently small (see [44] for
reference).
Let F¯
[mi]
i denote the set of initial conditions x¯
[mi]
i for which
the FHOCP problem is feasible. We define F¯
[mi]
i as the local
feasibility domain for the unperturbed dynamics. Such set is a
polyhedron. Note that u¯
[mi]
i (k) is continuous and polyhedral
piecewise affine (PPWA) over F¯
[mi]
i . This means that it is
defined over a non-overlapping polyhedral partitioning of F¯
[mi ]
i
and, over each partition P
[mi]
i,r , r ∈ {1, · · · ,n
[mi]
ri }, the solution
is affine
u¯
[mi]
i (k) = K
[mi]
i (x¯
[mi]
i (k)) = Γrx¯
[mi]
i (k)+gr, if x¯
[mi]
i (k) ∈ P
[mi]
i,r .
Denote F
[mi ]
i = F¯
[mi]
i ⊕E
[mi]
i . F
[mi]
i is again a polyhedron which
can be expressed by a set of linear inequalities.
Let us define F [m] = F
[m1]
1 ×·· ·×F
[mN ]
N , E
[m] = E
[m1]
1 ×·· ·×
E
[mN ]
N , D
[m] =D
[m1]
1 ×·· ·×D
[mN ]
N , and denote with x the column
vector collecting the state vectors xi, i= 1, . . . ,N. The scalable
tube based MPC summarized above guarantees the robust sta-
bility to the set E [m] and constraint satisfaction for the overall
LSS: if x(0)∈ F [m],∀i∈ 1, . . . ,N, then x(k)∈ F [m],∀k ∈N, and
limk→∞ d(x(k),E
[m])→ 0 [38].
Remark 4: The optimal value function V (x¯
[mi]
i (k)) is con-
vex, continuous and piecewise quadratic over F¯
[mi]
i whose level
sets are piecewise ellipsoidal invariant sets for the system (see
[46] for further details). The feasibility set, value function and
optimizer can be computed explicitly using, for example, the
MPT toolbox [47].
Remark 5: The presence of communication between neigh-
boring subsystems enables the design of distributed controllers
which can exploit the knowledge (or partial knowledge) of
some state variables of the neighbors. When compared to a
fully decentralized approach, this knowledge can facilitate the
stabilization of the overall system. Besides, in a distributed
framework, the resulting disturbance w
[mi ]
i (Eq. (6)) is in
general going to be smaller than the original z
[mi]
i , thus
enhancing the performance of the proposed set-based fault
diagnosis approach (see Section IV). More specifically, as it
will be clear in the following, a smaller disturbance set implies
a less conservative passive fault detection and increases the
feasibility of the fault isolation problem.
Summing up, the considered scalable tube-based MPC guar-
antees global stability of the LSS in nominal conditions. Fur-
thermore, thanks to the local low-dimension of the subsystems
it is possible to explicitly compute the local feasible domains
F
[mi ]
i , which will be used by the proposed FTC scheme (see
Sections IV-B and V) to guarantee stability and constraint
satisfaction for the LSS even after the occurrence of a fault.
More specifically, after fault detection, the goal of the Active
Fault Isolation is to design a local input sequence able to
isolate the occurred fault, remaining in the local feasibility
domains. In this way, it will be possible to reconfigure the
local controller according to the isolated model and to continue
guaranteeing local and global stability.
IV. ROBUST FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
This section presents the distributed fault detection and
isolation procedures used in the proposed FTC approach. In
the time interval [0,kd ], the nominal model mi = 1 is believed
to be active and u
[1]
i (k) is determined using the control law
κ
[1]
i . At the same time, passive fault detection is done using a
set-based approach as described in Section IV-A. After fault
detection, in the interval [kd ,kis], active fault isolation is carried
out, as described in Section IV-B.
6A. Local Passive Fault Detection
According to the tube based MPC approach described in
Section III-A, if e
[mi]
i (0) ∈ E
[mi]
i and w
[mi ]
i (k) ∈W
[mi ]
i , ∀k ∈ N,
then e
[mi]
i (k) ∈ E
[mi]
i , ∀k ∈ N. This property is very useful for
detecting, in a decentralized or distributed way (depending
on the available resources), the presence of a possible fault
in subsystem i. At each time step k+ 1, given the nominal
state x
[1]
i (k+1) obtained by solving the FHOCP at time k, we
compute the error e
[1]
i (k+ 1) between x
[1]
i (k+ 1) and the real
state xi(k+ 1).
Fault detection sufficient condition. If, at any k+ 1> 0,
e
[1]
i (k+ 1) /∈ E
[1]
i , (9)
then, the nominal model mi = 1 is not consistent with the be-
havior of the subsystem, i.e. a fault has occurred in subsystem
i.
Structural detectability has been widely studied in the
centralized case [43]. A complete detectability analysis of
the proposed method is out of the scope of this paper, but
it is worth noting that if a fault is not detectable, then it
will not compromise the stability of the system thanks to
the proposed FTC framework. On the other side, there is
an important issue which needs to be addressed. If a fault
in subsystem i leads to the violation of local constraints Xi,
then, the stability of the overall system is compromised. The
following theorem provides conditions to avoid, within the
Plug-and-Play framework, this situation.
Theorem 1: Define M+i ≡Mi\{1}. Assume there exists a
polyhedral set S¯
[1]
i ⊆ F¯
[1]
i which is invariant for the nominal
dynamics (3) and such that, for all mi ∈M
+
i
A
[mi]
ii
(
S¯
[1]
i ⊕E
[1]
i
)
⊕B
[mi]
i
(
K
[1]
i (S¯
[1]
i )⊕K
[1]
ii E
[1]
i
)
(10)
⊕
j∈N
[mi ]
i
(
A
[mi ]
i j + δi jB
[mi]
i K
[1]
i j
)
X j⊕Di+ r
[mi]
i ⊆ Xi.
Then, the restriction of the operation of each subsystem (2)
to S¯
[1]
i ⊕E
[1]
i rather than F
[1]
i guarantees that the occurrence
of any fault mi ∈M
+
i cannot compromise the stability of the
overall system.
Proof: The nominal invariance of S¯
[1]
i guarantees, if xi ∈
S¯
[1]
i ⊕E
[1]
i , recursive feasibility and convergence to E
[1]
i for any
fault which can be interpreted as disturbance (i.e. whose effect
is not distinguishable from e
[1]
i ∈ E
[1]
i ) [44]. In the opposite
case, two scenarios are possible:
• xi(k+ 1) ∈ S¯
[1]
i ⊕E
[1]
i but e
[1]
i (k+ 1) /∈ E
[1]
i . Then a fault
is detected and can be either isolated (using the proce-
dure described in the following section) or the system
unplugged. In any case, the stability of the overall system
does not get compromised since the local subsystem does
not leave Xi.
• xi(k+ 1) /∈ S¯
[1]
i ⊕E
[1]
i . In this case, in order to not com-
promise the stability of the overall system, it is necessary
to guarantee that xi(k+ 1)⊆ Xi for any fault mi ∈ M
+
i .
Recall that the nominal input u¯
[1]
i (k) can be expressed by
the mapping K
[1]
i (x¯
[1]
i ) and the input for the perturbed
system is given by (4) with mi = 1. Note that, the FHOCP
has among its constraints xi(k)− x¯
[1]
i (k)∈E
[1]
i . Now, if the
FHOCP was feasible at time k, x¯
[1]
i (k)∈ S¯
[1]
i . Then, taking
any possible dynamics of the i-th subsystem (2) in closed-
loop with (4), and replacing any occurrence of x¯
[1]
i (k)
with S¯
[1]
i , xi(k)− x¯
[1]
i (k) with E
[1]
i , x j(k) with X j and di
with Di, leads exactly to condition (10) which guaran-
tees that the faulty dynamics will not leave the space
Xi. Under the assumption of a Plug-and-Play scenario,
when xi(k+ 1) ∈ Xi \ (S¯
[1]
i ⊕ E
[1]
i ) it is always possible
to unplug the i-th subsystem so to avoid violation of
the state constraints for the neighboring subsystems and,
consequently, preserve the overall stability.
Remark 6: Finding polyhedral invariant sets within F¯
[1]
i
for the nominal dynamics can be obtained by following the
procedure provided in, e.g. [48]. An iterative procedure can
be applied, using for example bisection, in order to find the
biggest invariant set satisfying (10). Note that, using e.g. the
MPT toolbox, it is possible to compute explicitly mapping
K
[1]
i (x¯
[1]
i ) and therefore verify (10) through set inclusions.
Remark 7: Note that (10) is quite different from requiring
robust stability in presence of faults. Indeed it is a much
weaker condition which guarantees only that in one step there
will not be any violation of the local state constraints. Note
also that invariance of set S¯
[i]
i is necessary to guarantee the
recursive feasibility of condition (10).
While this approach allows to detect the presence of a
fault, due to the presence of w
[mi]
i the passive isolation of the
malfunction could be challenging, dealing with conservative
results. For this reason, in the following, we suggest to use a
distributed version of the active FDI scheme proposed in [19].
B. Local Active Fault Isolation
Suppose condition (9) is verified at time kd , indicating that
a fault occurred at some time k f with 0 ≤ k f < kd . Assume
no further faults occur in the LSS between k f and the time kis
at which isolation is complete. At time kd , the active model
mi 6= 1 is unknown.
After fault detection, the control law defined in (4) is
deactivated and the following input strategy
u
[mi ]
i (k) = u¯i(k)+ ∑
j∈Ni
δi jK
[mi]
i j x j(k) (11)
is used for isolation, where u¯i(k) will be designed according
to (15a)-(15g) to separate the different possible faulty models.
Note that, the local feedback component has been removed
since feedback compensation could make isolation more dif-
ficult. On the other side, as the influence of the neighbors is
treated as a disturbance to the local dynamics, it continues to
be minimized through K
[mi]
i j , in order to tighten the uncertainty
sets W
[mi]
i .
By using (11), system (1)-(2) can be rewritten as
xi(k+ 1) = A
[mi]
ii xi(k)+B
[mi]
i u¯i(k)+w
[mi]
i (k)+ r
[mi]
i (12)
w
[mi ]
i (k) = ∑
j∈N
[mi]
i
(A
[mi ]
i j + δi jB
[mi]
i K
[mi]
i j )x j(k)+di(k).
7With a slight abuse of notation we redefine
φ
[mi]
i{k}(
˜¯ui(0 : k),xi(0), w˜
[mi ]
i (0 : k))
as the solution map related to (12). Similarly, we redefine the
state reachable sets according to system (12)
X
[mi ]
i
(
˜¯ui(k0 : k|k0),xi(k0),W˜
[mi]
i{k−k0}
)
=
{
φ
[mi]
i{k−k0}
( ˜¯ui(k0 : k|k0),xi(k0), w˜
[mi]
i (k0 : k)) :
w˜
[mi ]
i (k0 : k) ∈ W˜i{k−k0}
}
. (13)
The objective of the distributed active fault isolation is
to isolate the local malfunction by driving the system to
a state condition consistent with only one faulty model. In
other words, for any couple of models αi, βi ∈M
+
i ,αi 6= βi,
we look for existence of a local sequence ˜¯ui(kd : kd +Ti|kd)
leading to x
[αi]
i (kd + Ti) 6= x
[βi]
i (kd + Ti), for all (w˜
[αi]
i (kd :
kd+Ti), w˜
[βi]
i (kd : kd+Ti)) ∈ W˜
[αi]
i ×W˜
[βi]
i , where x
[αi]
i (kd+Ti)
and x
[βi]
i (kd + Ti) denote the value of the state variables Ti
steps after fault detection, evolving from x
[αi]
i (kd) = x
[βi]
i (kd) =
xi(kd) according to (1), with models αi and βi, respectively.
This corresponds to verify the separation of the state reach-
able sets at time kd +Ti, i.e.
X
[αi]
i ( ˜¯ui(kd : kd +Ti|kd),xi(kd))∩
X
[βi]
i ( ˜¯ui(kd : kd +Ti|kd),xi(kd)) = /0 (14)
for all the possible faulty dynamics in M+i (assuming that
Mi is exhaustive). For ease of reading, in the following,
the dependence of the reachable sets on W˜
[αi]
i , W˜
[βi]
i will be
omitted.
In order to compute the minimally harmful (in terms of
length/norm) input sequence guaranteeing diagnosis we solve
the following optimization problem:
min
˜¯ui(kd :kd+Ti |kd)
∥∥ ˜¯ui(kd : kd +Ti|kd)
∥∥2
2
(15a)
subject to dynamics (1)− (2) (15b)
x
[mi]
i (kd) = xi(kd), ∀mi ∈M
+
i (15c)
u
[mi ]
i (k) ∈Ui, k ∈ [kd ,kd +Ti− 1] (15d)
X
[mi ]
i (k|kd)⊆ Xi, k ∈ [kd ,kd +Ti− 1] (15e)
X
[mi ]
i (kd +Ti|kd)⊆ S¯
[mi]
i ⊕E
[mi]
i , ∀mi ∈M
+
i (15f)
X
[αi]
i (kd +Ti|kd)∩X
[βi]
i (kd +Ti|kd) = /0, αi 6= βi (15g)
with increasing Ti = 1, · · · until the problem becomes feasible
or a Tmax is attained. Note that Tmax is a design parameter,
giving a limit to the maximum number of steps to have fault
isolation.
As explained in [19], in the case of zonotope sets, the
size of the state reachable sets does not depend on the input
sequence (the input affects only the center of these sets).
This property allows to replace (15e), (15f) in problem (15a)-
(15g) with simpler constraints (see [41]). According to [19],
the problem above can be reformulated as a mixed-integer
quadratic program (MIQP) which can be solved using, e.g.
CPLEX [49].
According to Section II-C, for a given input sequence and
an initial state condition xi(kd), the reachable set X
[mi ]
i (k|kd)
contains all the possible values of xi(k). Therefore, for each
mi ∈ M
+
i , constraint (15e) ensures that xi(k) ∈ Xi for all
k ∈ [kd ,kd + Ti− 1]. Similarly, for each mi ∈ Mi, constraint
(15f) ensures that x
[mi]
i (kd+Ti)∈ S¯
[mi]
i ⊕E
[mi]
i , that is, at the end
of the isolation horizon it will be possible to reconfigure the
MPC and to control the local state, guaranteeing stability and
constraint satisfaction. As shown in Section III, the satisfaction
of this constraint ensures that the controller κ
[mi]
i can be
feasibly implemented at time kd + Ti for any possible fault
mi ∈Mi.
This is summarized in the following result.
Proposition 1: If Problem (15a)-(15g) is feasible, robust
stability and constraint satisfaction are guaranteed for the
overall LSS by applying the input sequence (11), with ˜¯ui(kd :
kd + Ti|kd) computed solving (15a)-(15g), and reconfiguring
the i-th local controller using the control law κ
[mi]
i designed
in Section III-A for the isolated model mi 6= 1.
Proof: The proof follows from the result in [44] for the
stability in healthy conditions using tube-based controllers.
In Problem (15a)-(15g), the satisfaction of constraint (15e)
ensures that local state constraints continue to be guaranteed,
thus not endangering stability and constraints satisfaction in
neighboring subsystems and in the rest of the LSS. The
satisfaction of constraint (15f) ensures that at the end of the
isolation horizon the local MPC problem will be feasible
for any model mi ∈ M
+
i , thus allowing the computation of
the control law κ
[mi]
i , which guarantees robust stability and
constraint satisfaction for the overall LSS.
Remark 8: Note that the satisfaction of constraint (15f) may
be difficult in general. However, if problem (15a)-(15g) is not
feasible, we can still unplug the subsystem where the fault was
detected and still preserve the overall stability (see Section V).
It is worth noting that as far as the i-th subsystem continues
to guarantee local state constraints Xi, reconfiguration of
neighboring subsystems is not needed, no matter whether the
fault in i involves only local dynamics (matrix Aii) or the
interconnection dynamics Ai j: only subsystem i needs to be
reconfigured. Moreover, the unplugging of a subsystem is
always possible, by implying only a contraction of the set
W
[m j ]
j in the child subsystems j for which i ∈N
[m j ]
j .
Finally, by injecting ˜¯ui(kd : kd+Ti|kd), solution of problem
(15a)-(15g), into subsystem i, fault isolation is obtained in at
most Ti steps by verifying which reachable set X
[mi]
i (k|kd) the
real xi(kd+Ti) belongs to. Since the problem above guarantees
the isolability for all the possible realizations of w˜
[mi]
i (kd : kd+
Ti), it is possible to obtain an earlier isolation if at time k <
kd + Ti, xi(k) is already consistent with one model mi only.
Rather than applying the entire sequence ˜¯ui(kd : kd + Ti|kd),
it is possible to apply the Active FDI approach above in a
closed-loop fashion by re-solving problem (15a)-(15g) at each
time step with the newly available state (see e.g. [50]). While
this approach will increase active FDI performance, it comes
at the price of increased complexity.
8V. FTC STRATEGY
In this section, the tools introduced in the previous sections
are integrated for the proposed FTC strategy. At time k = 0,
the nominal model mi = 1 is active. During healthy nominal
behaviour, before fault detection, each subsystem is controlled
by the decentralized/distributed tube-based MPC introduced
in Section III-A and monitored by the passive fault detection
method in Section IV-A. At time k f , a single fault occurs in
subsystem i and is detected at time kd > k f (if the effect of the
fault cannot be explained by the local uncertainties represented
by w
[mi]
i ). At time kd , the Active Fault Isolation tool (see
Section IV-B) is activated. Three possible scenarios can be
in place, illustrated in Fig. 3 and described in the following.
Scenario 1 - Isolation and Control reconfiguration
There exists a control input sequence so that Problem (15a)-
(15g) is feasible, i.e.
i) it is possible to separate the reachable sets of the different
faulty dynamics (achieving therefore fault isolation), i.e.
X
[αi]
i (kd +Ti|kd)∩X
[βi]
i (kd +Ti|kd) = /0, ∀αi 6= βi, αi,βi∈M
+
i .
ii) the state after fault isolation is guaranteed to remain in the
domain of attraction:
X
[mi ]
i (kd +Ti|kd)⊆ S¯
[mi]
i ⊕E
[mi]
i , ∀mi ∈ M¯i.
The reconfiguration of the i-th local controller is therefore
feasible using the control law κ
[mi]
i designed in Section III-A
for the identified model mi 6= 1. In this first scenario, applying
the input sequence (11), with ˜¯ui(kd : kd +Ti|kd) computed by
the Active Fault Isolation tool (15a)-(15g), the fault is isolated
at most at time kd + Ti, identifying which model mi ∈ M
+
i
is acting in the local subsystem i. Furthermore, the computed
input guarantees that xi(kd+Ti)∈ S¯
[mi]
i ⊕E
[mi]
i . At time kd+Ti,
once the novel “nominal” dynamics is isolated, its controller is
implemented continuing to guarantee the stability of the LSS;
it will not be necessary to disconnect the faulty subsystem or
to reconfigure neighboring subsystems because, since the local
controller continues to satisfy local state constraints Xi, the
influence of the reconfigured subsystem i on the neighboring
subsystems j ∈ N
[
i mi] remains bounded by W
[m j ]
j , as before
the local control reconfiguration of i.
Scenario 2 - Isolation and Unplugging
There exists a control input sequence so that it is possible to
achieve correct fault isolation, i.e. there exists a solution for
Problem (15a) satisfying
X
[αi]
i (kd +Ti|kd)∩X
[βi]
i (kd +Ti|kd) = /0, αi 6= βi,
but we cannot satisfy constraint (15f), that is, we cannot guar-
antee the reconfiguration properties xi(kd+Ti)∈ S¯
[mi]
i ⊕E
[mi]
i at
the end of the Active Fault Isolation process for some mi ∈ M¯i.
The stability of the system is anyway guaranteed thanks to
constraint (15e). Depending on the level of criticality of the
considered application, the operator/decision system can de-
cide whether to immediately disconnect the faulty subsystem
or to continue with the local fault isolation without constraint
(15f) in order to understand the source of the problem. Again,
after fault isolation we may decide to disconnect the faulty
subsystem or we can use the additional knowledge to take a
decision.
Scenario 3 - Unplugging
It is not possible to find a local control input sequence so to
achieve fault isolation, i.e. Problem (15a)-(15g) is not feasible
even without constraint (15f). We can therefore decide to
immediately disconnect the faulty subsystem in order to avoid
or reduce the propagation of the fault effects in the network
of the LSS.
Plug-and-Play approaches [37] can be used to design the
local controllers so to allow Plug-and-Play operations, pro-
viding conditions for the plug-in of novel subsystems. In
this case, after the problem is solved in the disconnected
faulty subsystem, it can be re-plugged into the network of
the LSS, by checking before whether the conditions for the
plug-in are satisfied. Note that, when using a Plug-and-Play
approach, the design of the controller for subsystem i requires
at most information about the subsystem under control and its
neighbors.
The entire procedure is repeated if and when a new fault
occurs. As presented in this section, Active Fault Diagnosis
can be seen as an important tool to support the decision-
making process for the control and monitoring of the LSS.
Note that an active input is used for local fault isolation, but
not for fault detection. This avoids conflicts between fault de-
tectability and control objectives that would degrade nominal
performance. Conversely, the input is not restricted by stability
or performance considerations during fault isolation. However,
state constraints are enforced, as well as the condition that
a stabilizing controller can be implemented after isolation.
Overall stability follows provided that the active input design
problem is feasible.
VI. EXTENSIONS
In this section, some extensions to the previous results are
briefly illustrated.
A. Explicit solution of the Active Fault Isolation problem
It is worth noting that Problem (15a)-(15g) can be solved
explicitly as a function of the state xi(kd) for each i∈N (see
[24] for the details in the centralized case). This represents an
additional tool that can be used by the proposed distributed
Fault Tolerant Control Architecture as a support decision
scheme. By solving Problem (15a)-(15g) for every state of the
state constraint space, it is possible to build a map of the state
space. At fault detection time, by measuring the state xi(kd),
it is already possible to know which FTC scenario (Scenario
1, 2 or 3) will occur depending on the feasibility of Problem
(15a)-(15g), and it is possible to take an immediate decision
about the action to take to guarantee LSS safe operation. In the
simulation Section we show the use of this tool in an example
(see Figure 7).
B. Measurement noise
To allow focusing on the main results and to simplify the
presentation, in the previous sections the measurement noise
9Fig. 3. The proposed FTC strategy. Three possible scenarios are considered by the Active Fault Isolation procedure.
has not been considered. However, it is possible to extend the
proposed approach to the case that the local output equation
can be described by
y
[mi]
i (k) = Cixi(k)+ vi(k),
where y
[mi]
i (k) ∈ R
nxi denotes the output vector of subsystem
i, vector vi(k) represents the measurement noise and Ci is
the output matrix. In this paper, we do not consider sensor
faults. We assume that the pair (A
[mi]
ii ,Ci) is observable for
each i ∈N . The following assumption is required:
Assumption 6: The measurement noise vi(k) is bounded by
a known set vi(k) ∈ Vi, ∀k, ∀i ∈ N , being Vi zero-centered
zonotopes which are known a priori.
The output reachable set has to be defined accordingly
Y
[mi ]
i (k|k0) = CiX
[mi ]
i (u˜
[mi ]
i (k0 : k|k0),xi(k0),W˜
[mi]
i{k−k0}
)⊕Vi.
The local control law can be computed in a distributed way
by means of an output-feedback model predictive control, for
example as in [51], which uses a distributed state observer.
Then, a similar procedure for distributed fault diagnosis as
the one proposed in Sections IV-A and IV-B can be used. Dif-
ferently from Section IV-A, in this scenario with measurement
noise, the set-based observer output estimation error is used
for passive fault detection, instead of (9). For the active fault
isolation, Problem (15a)-(15g) should be updated, requiring
the separability of the output reachable sets:
Y
[αi]
i (kd +Ti|kd)∩Y
[βi]
i (kd +Ti|kd) = /0, αi 6= βi;
instead of (15g), and tightening the controller domain con-
straint in (15f) as proposed in [50] in a set-valued observer-
based centralized scenario.
Note that set E
[mi]
i and tightened state and input constraints
X¯i
[mi] and U¯i
[mi ] will also be affected by Vi.
C. Parameter uncertainty in faulty model
It is possible to extend the proposed method to include
uncertainty in the parameters of the models of the faulty
dynamics.
We consider the case of classes of faults, each described by
parameters that can vary in a bounded interval. To take this
into account in Problem (15a)-(15g), we redefine the faulty
models’ dynamics in (1)-(2) using the unknown parameters’
averages, while including the uncertainties in redefined sets
W
[mi]
i . Specifically, we redefine:
Aii = A
[mi]
iinom
±∆A
[mi]
ii (16)
where A
[mi]
iinom
is obtained by averaging the uncertain parameters,
and ∆A
[mi]
ii is the maximum positive deviation to the matrix
caused by the uncertainty of the fault parameters. Similar
notation can be used for all other matrices in (1)-(2).
To account for the parameter uncertainty in Problem (15a)-
(15g), sets W
[mi ]
i (6) are redefined as:
W
[mi]
i =
⊕
j∈N
[mi ]
i
(
(A
[mi]
i jnom
+B
[mi]
inom
K
[mi]
i j )+ (∆A
[mi]
i j +∆B
[mi]
i K
[mi]
i j )
)
X j
⊕∆A
[mi]
ii X
[mi]
i ⊕∆B
[mi]
i U
[mi]
i ⊕Di.
(17)
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
Fig. 4. Power Network System with 5 generation areas, interconnected as
in Scenario 2 of [37].
In this section we show the effectiveness of the proposed
distributed FTC methodology, applying it on a Power Network
System (PNS) [37] composed of 5 generation areas which are
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interconnected through tie-lines. Specifically, we consider the
case described in Scenario 2 of [37], illustrated in Figure 4.
We assume that the communication network between local
controllers mirrors the physical coupling graph.
In the simulations, we firstly design the distributed tube-
based MPC controller to regulate each area during nominal
operation, and for each faulty model in M+i ,∀i ∈ N . Per-
formance of the proposed set-based passive fault detection
and active fault isolation strategies is shown in the case of
a fault occurring on one of the interconnected subsystems. If
feasible, isolation may be followed by the reconfiguration of
the subsystem controller to accommodate the isolated fault.
The dynamics of each subsystem, equipped with primary
control and linearised around the equilibrium, are:
x˙i = A
[mi]
ii xi+B
[mi]
i u
[mi]
i +L
[mi]
i ∆PLi +w
[mi]
i , (18)
w
[mi]
i = ∑
j∈N
[mi]
i
A
[mi]
i j x j+di,
where xi = (∆θi,∆ωi,∆Pmi ,∆Pvi)
′ is the local state,
u
[mi ]
i = ∆Pre fi is the control input of each area, ∆PLi is
the local power load and N
[mi]
i is the set of neighboring
areas directly connected to subsystem i through tie-lines.
More specifically, the matrices of system (18) are
A
[mi]
ii =


0 1 0 0
−
∑ j∈Ni Pi j
2H
[mi]
i
− Di
2H
[mi]
i
1
2H
[mi ]
i
0
0 0 − 1
Tti
1
Tti
0 − 1
RiTgi
0 − 1
Tgi


, B
[mi]
i =


0
0
0
1
Tgi

 ,
A
[mi]
i j =


0 0 0 0
Pi j
2H
[mi ]
i
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 , L
[mi]
i =


0
− 1
2H
[mi]
i
0
0

 .
The values of the parameters are defined as in [37] for
the nominal model mi = 1. Each subsystem is subject to the
following constraints on xi and u
[mi ]
i : |∆θi| ≤ 0.1, |∆ωi| ≤
0.2, |∆Pmi | ≤ 5, |∆Pvi | ≤ 5, |∆Pre fi | ≤ 5 for all subsystems. For
each generation area, discrete-time models as in (1) are
obtained by discretizing (18) with a sampling time Ts = 1 sec.
Disturbance di is assumed to be bounded by Di, a zonotope
defined in generator notation as Di = {10
−4Inxi ,0}, where
Inxi is the nxi-dimensional identity matrix. The noise level
is comparable to other examples in the literature [51], [52].
Local control matrices K
[mi]
ii and K
[mi]
i j are designed for each
subsystem i, for every model mi ∈ Mi, using the PnPMPC
toolbox for MATLAB [53]. The goal of the control is the
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) layer to maintain the
frequency in each area. As regards the FDI architecture, each
area is equipped with a local fault diagnoser.
A. Example 1
In the first example, each area of the PNS can be affected
by three different faults, characterized by a change of the
value of the inertia parameter H
[mi]
i . From an electrical point of
view, this represents a loss of the generation capability in the
considered generation area. The value of the inertia parameter
Fig. 5. Fault detection of Area 5 at time kd = 5. A 3D plot of the measurement
x5(5) (indicated with a blue star) and the corresponding detection tube E
[1]
5
centered in x¯
[1]
5 (5), both projected on (∆θ5,∆ω5,∆Pm5). Detection occurs, as
the measurement lies outside of the zonotope tube.
for the nominal model mi = 1 is H
[m1]
1 = 12 and for the the
faulty models mi = 2,3,4 the values of the inertia parameters
are H
[m2]
2 = 2.35, H
[m3]
3 = 2.6, and H
[m4]
4 = 2.85.
At time k f = 3, the inertia constant in Area 5 decreases
from H5 = 12 to H5 = 2.35 , corresponding to a reduction
of approximately 80% of the inertia value. Following the
occurrence of the fault at k f , the set-based passive fault
detection method detects the fault at time kd = 5. At this time
the measured state x5(kd) lies outside the zonotopic tube E
[1]
5
centred in the system’s nominal state x¯
[1]
5 (kd), as can be seen
in Figure 53.
After local fault detection, the local Active Fault Isolation
tool is initialized. The optimization Problem (15a)-(15g) is
solved using CPLEX. The tool returns the isolating input
u¯5(5) = −0.2979 which, after Ti = 1 time step, separates the
reachable sets of the dynamics given by the faulty models
mi ∈M
+
5 , and is able to exclude all faults except the correct
one, i.e. x5(kd + Ti) ∈ X
[m5]
5 (kd + Ti|kd) only for m5 = 2.
In Figure 6 we show the 3D projection onto the space
defined by the states (∆θ5,∆ω5,∆Pm5) of the reachable sets
X
[m5]
5 (kd + Ti|kd),∀m5 ∈ M
+
5 , as well as the projection of
x5(kd+Ti). Once the isolating input is computed and applied,
and the correct faulty model is identified, the subsystem is
reconfigured in order to accommodate the fault to which it is
subject. Hence, since Problem (15a)-(15g) is feasible, Scenario
1 of the FTC strategy is implemented, and the controller for
area 5 is changed from the one designed for m5 = 1 to that
for m5 = 2, resuming normal operation for the LSS.
Furthermore, we show in this scenario that the tool in-
troduced in Section VI-A, based on the off-line solution of
Problem (15a)-(15g), can be considered for decision support
in the FTC strategy . This allows the local fault diagnosers to
immediately check after fault detection which reconfiguration
strategy will be feasible (Scenario 1, 2 or 3 of Figure 3) as
a function of the state xi(kd). We show in Figure 7 a map
representing a portion of the state space for the considered
3We use a 3D projection of the states (∆θ5,∆ω5,∆Pm5) to visualize that
the state is not contained within the set
11
Fig. 6. Measured state x5(6) (blue asterisk) at time k= kd +Ti = 6, together
with reachable sets X
[m5]
5 (6|5),m5 ∈M
+
5 , separated by isolating input u¯5(5) =
−0.2979. Projection on components (∆θ5,∆ω5,∆Pm5 ). Note that there is no
intersection among the reachable sets.
-0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Scenario 3
Scenario 2
Scenario 1
Fig. 7. Map of the first two state components of X5 (with the other
components equal to ∆Pm5 = 0, ∆Pv5 = 0): for each cell of the grid the FTC
scenario to be implemented. The green and yellow areas are the ones from
where it is actually possible to separate the considered fault models and have
fault isolation.
PNS example: each cell of the map has a different color
depending on the FTC strategy that can be applied if the fault
detection occurs when the state is in that area. The portion of
state space that was considered is |∆θ5| ≤ 0.1, |∆ω5| ≤ 0.2,
∆Pm5 = 0, ∆Pv5 = 0. The map was obtained by explicitly
solving Problem (15a)-(15g) for 441 points in the state space
separated from each other by constant step sizes of 0.01 and
0.02 in the ∆θ5 and ∆ω5 directions, respectively.
B. Example 2
In this second example, we assume, similarly to Sec-
tion VI-C, that the possible faulty models for Area 5, i.e.
m5 ∈ M
+
5 , are no longer defined by a single value of the
fault parameter, as they were in Example 1. We consider
that fault parameter H
[m5]
5 is uncertain, and, for m5 = 1,2,3,4
can take values inside an interval as follows: H
[1]
5 = 12±0.1,
H
[2]
5 = 2.35± 0.1, H
[3]
5 = 2.60± 0.1, and H
[4]
5 = 2.85± 0.1.
Fig. 8. Reachable sets X
[m5 ]
5 (6|5),m5 ∈ M
+
5 , separated by isolating input
u¯5(5) =−1.0266, and measured state x[5](6) ∈ X
[2]
5 (6|5) (asterisk with black
bold circle). Projection on components (∆θ5,∆ω5,∆Pv5 ).
To deal with the parametric uncertainty, we redefine the
matrices in model (18) as defined in (16)4. ∆Aii and other
deviation matrices are calculated using MATLAB’s INTLAB
toolbox [54], which allows operations on intervals. Hence, we
redefine sets W
[mi]
i as in (17).
As in the first example, each area is locally equipped with
a regulator and a fault diagnoser. Again, at k f = 3 the model
describing Area 5 dynamics changes from m5 = 1 to m5 = 2.
The passive fault diagnosis tool again detects the fault at kd =
5. Hence the Active Fault Isolation tool solves Problem (15a)-
(15g), calculating the separating input sequence to be applied
to the faulty subsystem, u¯5 =−1.0266, with Ti = 1. In Figure 8
we show the three dimensional projection of the reachable sets
onto the states (∆θ5,∆ω5,∆Pv5)
5. Finally, the diagnoser applies
the separating input to the faulty subsystem, and is therefore
able to isolate the correct class of faults affecting the local
dynamics. Unfortunately, in order for Problem (15a)-(15g) to
be feasible, constraint (15f) X
[m5]
5 (kd + Ti|kd) ⊆ F
[m5]
5 has to
be relaxed to X
[m5]
5 (kd +Ti|kd) ⊆ X5. We therefore implement
Scenario 2 of the FTC strategy: after local fault isolation, the
unplugging of the faulty area is required to maintain overall
stability properties of the PNS.
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VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, a scalable distributed FTC scheme has been
presented for the monitoring of interconnected subsystems,
using Active Fault Isolation. After fault detection, the proposed
method allows to guarantee whether it is possible to correctly
4Note here that the uncertainty on H
[m5 ]
5 influences all matrices, due to
dynamics discretization.
5The apparent intersection of the reachable sets is caused by their projec-
tions from four-dimensional to three-dimensional space.
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isolate the fault in a finite number of steps and to safely re-
configure local controllers or if the disconnection of the faulty
subsystem is preferable in order to reduce the propagation of
the effects of the fault. The presence of measurement noise has
been investigated. Extensive simulation results are provided
on a Power Network System to show the effectiveness of the
proposed approach, considering also classes of faults where
the parameters characterizing each faulty model are uncertain
and may vary within a defined range of values.
As a future work, we will investigate the use of other
active fault diagnosis techniques in distributed and scalable
scenarios, such as hybrid stochastic-deterministic approaches
and the design of references instead of input sequences.
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